Helene O\u27Donnell v. Passport Health Communications by unknown
2014 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
3-28-2014 
Helene O'Donnell v. Passport Health Communications 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014 
Recommended Citation 
"Helene O'Donnell v. Passport Health Communications" (2014). 2014 Decisions. 345. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2014/345 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2014 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
 1 
 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2607 
_____________ 
  
HELENE O’DONNELL, 
                                          Appellant  
 
v. 
  
PASSPORT HEALTH COMMUNICATIONS, INC.   
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-11-cv-03231) 
District Judge:  Hon. Petrese B. Tucker 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 28, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: FUENTES and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges, and ROSENTHAL, District Judge.
*
 
 
(Filed: March 28, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Plaintiff Helene O’Donnell brought suit against her former employer, Passport 
Health Communications, Inc. (“Passport”), alleging, among other things, violations of the 
                                              
 
*
 The Honorable Lee H. Rosenthal, United States District Judge for the Southern 
District of Texas, sitting by designation. 
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Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).  She contends that while she was on leave, 
Passport contacted her about signing certain employment documents and required her to 
return them during the period of her medical leave in order to secure a new position she 
was offered before her leave commenced.  She failed to return the documents, and was 
terminated.  The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Passport on the 
FMLA claim.  O’Donnell appeals this ruling.  We will affirm. 
I. Factual & Procedural History 
 O’Donnell was employed as a sales executive at Passport, reporting to its 
Pennsylvania location from 2006 until her termination on January 28, 2011.  In August 
and September 2010, Passport began a reorganization, which included the consolidation 
of the sales force and elimination of O’Donnell’s Pennsylvania sales team.  O’Donnell’s 
supervisor, Charles Penrose, discussed these changes with her in August 2010, and in 
October 2010, he informed her that her position would be eliminated and recommended 
that she apply for a position in Passport’s National Sales Force based in Tennessee. 
 On January 6, 2011, O’Donnell met with Vera Payne, a Passport Human 
Resources employee, who offered O’Donnell a position as a Regional Vice President in 
Tennessee and told O’Donnell that her position in Pennsylvania was being eliminated, 
effective immediately.  Payne also told her that, in order to assume the new position, 
O’Donnell was required to sign a non-compete agreement.  O’Donnell sought, and 
received, time for her attorney to review the non-compete agreement.
1
  On January 8, 
                                              
 
1
 O’Donnell had previously received the non-compete agreement when it was 
circulated to every employee at Passport.  
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2011, Payne sent an email to O’Donnell transmitting an offer letter, job description, and 
non-compete agreement, and asked O’Donnell to return the signed forms by January 10.  
O’Donnell testified that she understood that signing the non-compete agreement was a 
requirement for taking the new job.  O’Donnell called Payne on January 10 and told 
Payne she would not sign the agreement because she was continuing to seek the help of 
her attorney and was negotiating for a higher salary with her new boss, Scott Bagwell.
2
   
 On January 19, 2011, O’Donnell sought treatment for anxiety and panic attacks, 
and her doctor advised her to take leave from work until January 31.  At 9:40 p.m. that 
evening, O’Donnell forwarded to Payne a copy of her doctor’s orders, thereby informing 
Passport that she would be taking medical leave until January 31, 2011.
3
  On January 21, 
2011, O’Donnell and Bagwell communicated by e-mail about the new position and 
O’Donnell’s salary, which Bagwell agreed to raise from $70,000 to $75,000.  That same 
day, O’Donnell forwarded to Bagwell the doctor’s orders concerning her medical leave, 
and Bagwell responded, “as we discussed we will work through HR, given your doctor’s 
orders.”  App. 295. 
 Later on January 21, 2011, Payne sent O’Donnell an email in which she repeated 
that O’Donnell’s prior position had been terminated and offered her two options: sign the 
non-compete agreement and accept the new position at the increased salary offered by 
Bagwell or receive a severance payment for the termination of the prior position.  The 
                                              
 
2
 In an affidavit O’Donnell filed in opposing summary judgment, she also claims 
that she proposed changes to the non-compete agreement to Payne and submitted a memo 
concerning her raise to Bagwell on January 11, but did not receive a response to either 
before taking medical leave. 
 
3
 The leave was later extended to February 2, 2011.  
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email said that the deadline to accept or reject the offer was January 28, 2011, and that if 
O’Donnell did not respond by that date, Passport would “assume you are rejecting the 
offer and effectively making [January 28] your last day of employment.”  App. 240.  On 
January 27, 2011, Payne again emailed to remind O’Donnell of the January 28 deadline 
and wrote that “[i]f we do not hear from you, we will assume that you have elected to 
terminate your employment with Passport.”  App. 213. 
 On January 28, 2011, O’Donnell responded to Payne’s email, writing, “I assure 
you that I am not voluntarily resigning my employment and that I am fully involved in 
beginning work as the Regional VP, Sales.”  App. 239.  O’Donnell’s response did not 
reference the non-compete agreement.  Payne responded by e-mail that she was “glad to 
hear [O’Donnell was] interested in accepting” the new position, but that O’Donnell still 
needed to formally indicate her acceptance by signing the offer letter and the non-
compete agreement by the end of the day.  App. 238.  Forty-five minutes later, at 5:30 
p.m., Payne again e-mailed O’Donnell, reiterating that “the offer of employment is 
revoked should we not receive the documentation (signed offer letter and non-compete) 
from you by end of business today.”  App. 238.  O’Donnell never returned the non-
compete or the offer letter, and was formally terminated effective January 28, 2011.
4
  
 O’Donnell filed this suit on May 18, 2011, alleging that Passport violated, among 
other things, the FMLA by interfering with her leave and retaliating against her for taking 
                                              
 
4
 Passport formally informed O’Donnell of the termination in a letter dated 
February 1, 2011.  
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leave.
5
  Following discovery, the parties filed motions for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Passport on O’Donnell’s FMLA 
claim and denied O’Donnell’s motion for partial summary judgment.6  This appeal 
followed.
7
 
                                              
 
5
 O’Donnell also alleged that Passport violated the Pennsylvania Wage Payment & 
Collection Law (“WPCL”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 260.1-260.45, by failing to pay 
compensation due to her, and asserted claims for unjust enrichment and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress.  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
Passport’s favor on the two state common law claims, but denied Passport’s motion as to 
the WPCL claim.  On May 8, 2013, the District Court issued an order declining to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the WPCL claim.  These rulings have not been 
appealed. 
 
6
 O’Donnell also filed a motion for reconsideration, which the District Court 
denied.   
 
7
 Passport contends that O’Donnell’s appeal is untimely.  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(1)(A) requires a notice of appeal to be filed with the district clerk within thirty days 
after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.  If a notice of appeal is untimely, we 
must dismiss the case for lack of appellate jurisdiction because “the timely filing of a 
notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.”  Bowles v. Russell, 551 
U.S. 205, 214 (2007).  The time limitation in Rule 4 does not begin to run until the 
district court issues a “final” order.  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 
183 (3d Cir. 2010).  Generally, “an order which terminates fewer than all claims, or 
claims against fewer than all parties, does not constitute a ‘final’ order for purposes of 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”  Carter v. City of Phila., 181 F.3d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Because the District Court’s summary judgment order of April 10, 2013 did not 
terminate O’Donnell’s state WPCL claim, it was not a final order for purposes of § 1291.  
The District Court’s May 8 order, in which it declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the WPCL claim, resolved all of her claims and hence was a final order.  
O’Donnell filed her appeal of the summary judgment order on June 6, 2013.  Thus, her 
appeal of the summary judgment order was timely. 
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II. Discussion
8
 
 The FMLA and its accompanying regulations “entitle employees to take 
reasonable leave for medical reasons.”  29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2).  To this end, “[the 
FMLA] creates a series of prescriptive substantive rights for eligible employees, often 
referred to as the ‘entitlement’ or ‘interference’ provisions which set floors for employer 
conduct.”  Callison v. City of Phila., 430 F.3d 117, 119 (3d Cir. 2005).  Relevant to this 
case, § 2615(a)(1) makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny 
the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”  29 
U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1).  The FMLA’s implementing regulations also make it unlawful for 
                                              
 
8
 The District Court exercised federal question jurisdiction over O’Donnell’s 
federal claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court’s order granting summary 
judgment.  Jacobs Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Servs., Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 369 (3d 
Cir. 2001).  Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  In reaching this decision, we must determine “whether 
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits 
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the moving party is 
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill SNF, L.L.C., 
675 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 
(1986)).  A disputed issue is “genuine” only “if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on 
which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.”  Kaucher v. Cnty. of 
Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242, 248 (1986)).  A factual dispute is “material” only if it might affect the outcome 
of the suit under governing law.  Doe v. Luzerne Cnty., 660 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(citing Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Court’s 
task is not to resolve disputed issues of fact, but to determine whether there exist any 
factual issues to be tried.  Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-49.  “In making this determination, 
we must consider the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party.” Jacobs Constructors, Inc., 264 F.3d at 369 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). 
 7 
 
an employer to retaliate against an employee for invoking their FMLA rights.
9
  
Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 301-02 (3d Cir. 2012).   
 O’Donnell contends that Passport: (1) interfered with her rights under the FMLA 
by failing to permit her to take a qualified leave of absence in accordance with the 
provisions of the FMLA; and (2) retaliated against her for taking FMLA leave when it 
terminated her employment.  We will first address her interference claim. 
A. Interference 
 To prevail on an interference claim, an employee need only show that she was 
entitled to benefits under the FMLA and that her employer denied them.
10
  Callison, 430 
F.3d at 119.  “Interfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights would include, for 
example, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from 
using such leave.  It would also include manipulation by a covered employer to avoid 
responsibilities under [the] FMLA.”  Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 
135, 142 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Though employees are also 
entitled to be reinstated to their former position or an equivalent when they return from 
leave, “if an employee is discharged during or at the end of a protected leave for a reason 
                                              
 
9
 The regulation prohibiting retaliation provides, in pertinent part, “[t]he Act’s 
prohibition against interference prohibits an employer from discriminating or retaliating 
against an employee or prospective employee for having exercised or attempted to 
exercise FMLA rights.”  29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c).  A violation of the regulation can give 
rise to a “retaliation” claim.  Callison, 430 F.3d at 119.   
 
10
 A plaintiff need not show discriminatory intent to prevail on an interference 
claim.  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 312; see also Callison, 430 F.3d at 120 (“An interference 
action is not about discrimination, it is only about whether the employer provided the 
employee with the entitlements guaranteed by the FMLA.”).   
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unrelated to the leave, there is no right to reinstatement.”  Id. at 141 (citing 29 C.F.R. 
§ 825.216(a)(1)). 
 Passport does not dispute that O’Donnell was entitled to benefits under the FMLA 
because she was an eligible employee and she provided adequate notice to Passport of a 
serious health condition and her intent to take leave.  Thus, we need only decide whether 
Passport interfered with O’Donnell’s leave by requiring her to perform work-related tasks 
during her leave—specifically, by requiring her to sign the offer letter and non-compete 
agreement and by negotiating with her concerning her salary.  
 Passport imposed the requirement that O’Donnell sign the offer letter and the non-
compete agreement before she took FMLA leave.  She was informed of the requirement 
that she sign the forms on January 6, 2011, and that she was to have done so by January 
10, 2011.  O’Donnell did not begin her leave, however, until January 20.  Thus, 
O’Donnell knew that she needed to sign the forms well before she invoked her FMLA 
rights,
11
 and there is no evidence that Passport’s requirement that she sign the forms or 
the consequence for failing to do so arose because she took leave. 
                                              
 
11
 O’Donnell’s post-deposition assertion that she did not know she faced 
termination before she took FMLA leave does not change the result.  O’Donnell testified 
at her deposition that she was aware that her previous position had been terminated and 
that the non-compete agreement “was a required document for the new position.”  App. 
116.  In her affidavit, she repeated that she understood when she received the non-
compete that her previous position had been terminated, but stated that she did not know 
that she faced termination until she took her FMLA leave.  O’Donnell cannot rely on the 
portions of her affidavit that contradict her prior sworn testimony to manufacture 
disputed issues of material fact.  See Hackman v. Valley Fair, 932 F.2d 239, 241 (3d Cir. 
1991) (“When, without a satisfactory explanation, a nonmovant’s affidavit contradicts 
earlier deposition testimony, the district court may disregard the affidavit in determining 
whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.”).  She proffers no explanation for her 
 9 
 
 Furthermore, Passport’s contacts with O’Donnell while she was on leave were 
limited to the status of her decision, the documents, and her salary request, as well as 
acknowledging she was on medical leave.  Bagwell communicated with O’Donnell 
concerning only her FMLA leave and negotiating her salary.  O’Donnell had initiated 
those salary negotiations before she requested or commenced her leave.  Payne’s contacts 
with O’Donnell after January 20 were merely to remind O’Donnell that her previous 
position had been eliminated and that, if she wanted to accept the new position, she 
remained under an obligation to do so formally by signing the required forms and 
returning them to Passport.   
 These de minimis contacts did not require O’Donnell to perform work to benefit 
the company and did not materially interfere with her leave.  As this Court has previously 
explained, “there is no right in the FMLA to be ‘left alone,’” and be completely absolved 
of responding to the employer’s discrete inquiries.  Callison, 430 F.3d at 121 (requiring 
employees on FMLA leave to notify the employer when leaving home and upon return 
does not interfere with FMLA); see also Reilly v. Revlon, Inc., 620 F. Supp. 2d 524, 537 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (occasional phone calls inquiring about files do not qualify as 
“interference” with FMLA leave); Kesler v. Barris, Sott, Denn & Driker, PLLC, 482 F. 
Supp. 2d 886, 910-11 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (same).  Here, the contacts were aimed only at 
                                                                                                                                                  
changed position on this issue, and her affidavit otherwise reiterates the key facts on 
which the District Court’s decision relied: she knew her old position had been eliminated 
on January 6, and that to assume a new position required her to sign a non-compete.  See 
also App. 115-16 (O’Donnell’s deposition testimony that she knew she was required to 
sign the non-compete to assume the new position).  Thus, the record supports the District 
Court’s conclusion that O’Donnell was aware of the consequences of failing to sign the 
agreement before she took FMLA leave. 
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retaining O’Donnell as an employee, and there is no evidence showing that Passport in 
any way hampered or discouraged O’Donnell’s exercise of her right to medical leave, or 
attempted to persuade her to return from her leave early.
12
  For these reasons, the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment in Passport’s favor on the interference claim. 
B. Retaliation 
 O’Donnell also asserts a retaliation claim, alleging that she was discharged 
because she took FMLA leave.  To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show 
that “(1) she invoked her right to FMLA-qualifying leave, (2) she suffered an adverse 
employment decision, and (3) the adverse action was causally related to her invocation of 
rights.”  Lichtenstein, 691 F.3d at 301-02.  Unlike claims for interference, retaliation 
claims require a showing of the employer’s retaliatory intent.  Id.  Because O’Donnell 
presents only circumstantial evidence of intent, we assess her claim “under the burden-
shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v . Green, 411 U.S. 792 
(1973).”  Id.  That framework requires that a plaintiff first set forth a prima facie case of 
retaliation.  Id.  If O’Donnell does so, “the burden of production shifts to [Passport] to 
‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its decision.”  Id. (quoting 
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).  If Passport meets this burden, then O’Donnell 
                                              
 
12
 To the contrary, the record indicates that upon learning of O’Donnell’s leave, 
Penrose wrote in an email to O’Donnell, “I am here to help you in any way I can.”  App. 
448.  Similarly, upon speaking with O’Donnell about her leave, Bagwell, her new 
supervisor, told her that he would be working with O’Donnell “through HR, given your 
doctor’s orders.”  App. 295.  In sum, the record shows Passport supported O’Donnell’s 
medical leave. 
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must point to some evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably disbelieve 
Passport’s reason.  Id. 
 The parties do not dispute the first two elements of the prima facie claim—that 
O’Donnell invoked an FMLA right and that she was terminated.  Their argument centers 
on causation.  O’Donnell contends that a factfinder could infer that her termination was 
related to her FMLA leave because Payne’s email requiring O’Donnell either to return 
the signed documents or be terminated was sent only one day after O’Donnell notified 
Passport of her FMLA leave.  Temporal proximity can be sufficiently suggestive to 
satisfy the causation element at the prima facie stage.  See, e.g., id. at 307 (one week 
between invocation of FMLA rights and adverse employment action is “in the realm of 
what this Court and others have found sufficient at the prima facie stage”). 
 The problem for O’Donnell, however, is that the requirement that she sign the 
forms was instituted before she took FMLA leave.  As explained above, two weeks 
before O’Donnell invoked her FMLA rights, Passport required her to sign the offer letter 
and the non-compete agreement in order to assume her new job.  O’Donnell testified in 
her deposition that she understood that signing those forms was a requirement for the new 
position.  
 Even if Passport’s decision to enforce its requirement while O’Donnell was on 
FMLA leave was sufficient to satisfy the causation element, and hence fulfills the first 
step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the failure to sign those forms constitutes a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her.  Passport was reorganizing its 
sales force, eliminated O’Donnell’s previous position, and offered O’Donnell the 
 12 
 
opportunity to work as a Vice President contingent on her executing the forms.  
O’Donnell knew all of this weeks before she invoked her FMLA rights.  Passport has 
therefore met its burden at step two of McDonnell Douglas.  Moreover, O’Donnell 
cannot point to any evidence indicating that the decision to terminate her was pretextual.  
To the contrary, up until the January 28 deadline elapsed, Passport employees encouraged 
O’Donnell to return the forms and informed her that they were “glad to hear [she was] 
interested in accepting” the new position, and that she only needed to complete the forms 
to do so.  App. 238.   
 Accordingly, there are no facts from which a reasonable juror could find that 
O’Donnell’s termination was based on anything other than the legitimate, non-pretextual 
reason that she failed to complete the required paperwork to assume the new position.  
For this reason, the District Court properly granted summary judgment as to O’Donnell’s 
retaliation claim.
13
 
V. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court. 
                                              
 
13
 To the extent that O’Donnell contends that Passport terminated her employment 
because it discovered she might have a life-threatening illness, that argument is 
undermined by the fact that Passport allowed her to invoke her FMLA rights based on her 
doctor’s description of her condition, and there is no evidence that any decisionmaker 
acted on information other than her failure to execute the employment forms in deciding 
to terminate her. 
